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ABSTRACT
This paper shows that the i.position of an import quota by one country
can lead to increased competitiveness; protection can reduce the price in the
country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This emerges
from a model in which the firms are assumed to sustain collusion by the threat
of reversion to •ore competitive pricing. We consider both prices and
quantities as the straegic variables and study competition both in the
domestic and the foreign market taken individually, and in the two markets
taken together.
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I Introduction
This paper shows that the imposition of an Import quota by one country can
lead to Increased international competitiveness: protection can reduce the
price in the country that imposes the quota, the foreign country, or both. This
somewhat paradoxical result emerges from a model of Implicit collusion. In such
a setting the finns in an industry sustain collusive prices by the threat that
more competitive pricing will ensue if any firm deviates. The more powerful the
threat, the more collusion that can be sustained. Since a quota reduces the
ability of the foreign firms to punish a deviating domestic finn, the amount of
collusion that can be sustained is correspondingly diminished-
Westudy both the case in which sales and the case In which prices are the
strategic variables. Our results are strongest when prices are the strategic
variables: quotas always make monopolization of the domestic market more
difficult In that case -Thisis in sharp contrast to the results in static
imperfect competition models In which quotas tend to make it easier for the
domestic finn to act as a monopolist at home. It is also different from the
Impact of tariffs which, In a dynamic setting like the one studied here, do not
necessarily make it more difficult for the finns to sustain collusive outcomes.
Whether tariffs make collusion more difficult to sustain or not depends on
the severity of the punishments that the firms can reasonably be expected to
Inflict on their cheating rivals.The maximal punishments of the style
developed by Abreu (1982) involve an outcome in which the domestic firm earns
zero profits1. This is because even with a very large tariff, the foreign firm
can, if it is willing to tolerate the ensuing losses, charge a price so low that
it makes it Impossible for the domestic firmtoearn profits at home. As a
result, tariffs do not affect the ability of the duopoly to maintain3
monopolistic outcomes.
Contrast this with a quota. There the maximum punishment the foreign firm
can inflict on the domestic firm is to sell its entire quota. This generally
stifi yields positive profits for the domestic firm. Thus since the domestic
firm faces a lower punishment, it has a larger incentive to deviate from the
monopolistic outcome. This general Intuition must be qualified somewhat by the
fact that, as pointed out by Davidson (1984), trade restrictions also make it
less costly to the foreign country to let the domestic country have a larger
share of the domestic market. Thus the domestic firm's incentive to abide by
the collusive scheme can at least be partially restored by altering the market
shares In its favor and thereby giving it more to lose if it deviates.
In this case of maximal punishments, therefore, our results have the
opposite implication of those of Bhagwati (1965). In his classic paper he
showed that a single domestic producer who faced a competitive foreign market
would act more competitively with a tariff than with a quota. When we consider
a single domestic producer and a single foreign producer, the opposite result
emerges.
If the punishments are not as grim as this, but instead involve reverting
to the equilibrium from the one-shot game in each period, then large tariffs
(which are anologous to small quotas) make collusion more difficult to sustain.
In that case, then, the consequences of tariffs and quotas are similar.
As mentioned previously, our results are strongest for the case in which
prices are the strategic variables. When we analyze the case in which
quantities are the strategic variables we find that only small quotas break the
discipline of the oligopoly while large quotas, if anything, strengthen the
Incentives to go along with the monopolistic outcome. Thus our results for this
case parallel closely those of Davidson (1984) for tariffs. He uses quantifies4
as thestrategicvariables In a model very similar to ours and shows that small
tariffs promote collusion, while the opposite is true for large tariffs.
After considering the effects on monopolization in the country that imposes
the quota we study the foreign repercussions of quotas. We noticeimmediately
that the arguments we used to show that more competitionemerges in the country
that imposes the quota also Imply that quotas lead to Increasedcompetition
abroad if the the domestic firm Is capacity constrained. We model thecapacity
constraint In a simple way, assuming that the Finn can produce at constant
marginal cost up to some limit and cannot exceed that limit.Suppose that a
quota is imposed when the domestic firm is capacity constrained in this way. If
the monopoly output is to be sold In the domestic market, thepresence of a
quota requires that the domestic finn sell more at home. Therefore, it has only
a limited capacity to supply the foreign market. In that case its capacity
constraint has the same effect abroad as the quota does on the imports of the
foreign firm. Thus, for the reasons discussed above, more competition results
in the foreign market.
It is possible for quotas to lead to increased competition abroad even In
the absence of capacity constraints, however. Suppose, for example, that the
levels of demand fluctuate over time and are not perfectly correlated across
the two markets. In that case, in either market taken alone, the finnsmay be
unable to sustain the monopoly level of prices in all states. As in Rotemberg
and SaJ.oner (1986), when demand Is sufficiently high, the incentive to cheatmay
outweigh the punishment which is meted out in later, "more nonnal", periods.
As Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show, in such settings the firms can
sustain higher profits when they share two markets with imperfecUy correlated
demand. In the simplest case, (which is also the one that we study), the
markets are of equal size and have perfectly negatively correlated demand. In5
that case the two markets taken together are perfectly stable over time and
hence, since the firms' Incentive to cheat doesn't fluctuate over time, they may
be able to sustain monopoly profits each period. Imposing a quota on one of the
markets, however, means that the firms lose the countervailing force that
smooths the incentive to cheat when demand is high in the foreign market.
Instead, the foreign market is transformed into a market with fluctuating demand
and monopoly profits may no longer be sustainable there.
Thus theImpositionof a quota can Increase competition In the foreign
market or in the domestic market. The natural question is whether the separate
analyses discussed above can be combined to show that the imposition of a quota
can contemporaneously Increase competition in both the domestic and foreign
markets. We show that this is indeed the case.
The presence of implicit collusion is not the only reason why quotas may
result in increased competition in both markets. Indeed we demonstrate that the
model developed in Dixit and Kyle (1985) can be modified to show that potential
entry can have the same effect. -
Thepaper is organized as follows: We show that quotas can Increase
competition at home with prices as the strategic variables In Section II and
with quantities as the strategic variables in Section III. In Section IV, we
use the analysis developed in these sections to show that quotas can lead to
increased competition abroad if the domestic finn Is capacity constrained. We
show that in the presence of fluctuating demand that this can occur even when
the domestic finn is not capacity constrained in Section V. In Section VI we
show that increased competition can result in both the domestic and the foreign
market. Section VII concludes the paper with a discussion of the effect of
potential entry.6
II Quotas and price competition at home
There are two countries, domestic and foreign. We consider an
oligopoiistic industry with one domestic and one foreign firm. To start with
the simplest case we assume that the domestic firm makes no sales abroad. This
restriction is relaxed in Section IV.Marginal cost is constant and equal to c
in both countries. Foreign firms do not face any transportation costs from
shipping the good to the domestic country. however, the markets are segmented
so that consumers can only buy the good in their own country2. Thus the foreign
firm can charge a different price abroad than it does at home. Yet, and this
slightly contradictory assumption is made mainly for tractability, the goods
sold by the two firms are viewed as perfect substitutes in the domestic market.
Demand is given by:
2a-bQ (1)
where P Is the industry price and QIsthe sum of the amounts sold by the
domestic and foreign firms.
In this section price is the strategic variable. This means that if one
firm quotes a price lower than the other, it supplies the entire market. If the
two firms quote the same price they share the market. There are two possible
assumptions about the way in which this sharing is done. The first is that each
gets half the market. The second is that any possible market division is
feasible and that market shares are also implicitly agreed upon. However, in
the presence of quotas the foreign firm may be forced to have less than half of
the market. Thus the latter assumption is the only one that makes sense in this
case.7
We start by analyzing equilibrium under free trade. This equilibrium Is
the standard duopoly equilibrium in a repeated setting.We assume that the
finns try to sustain the monopoly price (a+c)/2 and that they each serve half
the market.4 Then, if neither firm deviates, each earns(a-c)2/4b per period.
Jf either firm deviates, It undercuts the price slightly and captures the entire
market so that it earns twice this amount. However after a deviation the firms
are assumed to revert forever to the noncooperative equilibriumfor the
corresponding one-period game which has a price equal to the marginal cost a.
This punishment which gives each finn profits of zero is also the strongest
possible punishment that can be conceived if the firms are free to leave the
industry5.It is then Impossible to make them earn negative profits.
With this punishment, each finn will be deterred from deviating as long as:
(a-c)2/4bS 8(a-c)2/4b(1-6)
where the BBS of this equation represents the future profits that are given up
by cheating and 6 is the rate at which future profits are discounted. So as
long as 6 equals at least 1/2, the monopoly price is sustainable.
We now consider the effect of a quota. Let the amount the foreign firm is
allowed to import be t(a-c)/b so that it is scaled by the amount that would be
sold under perfect competition. A quota where c is 1 would allow the foreign
firm to supply the amount demanded ataprice equal to marginal cost.
Similarly, If c is 1/2, It can sell the amount demanded at the monopoly price
of (a+c)/2, and soon.
Noticeas an aside that any quota which is binding at the original
equilibrium, I.e. which reduces the amount imported, raises the standard
measures of domestic welfare. This is so because, even if the price remains at8
(a+c)/2, the domestic finn having higher sales, now earns higher profits.
Domestic welfare is only increased further If the price actually falls6. Since
thenationalidentity of firms is a slippery concept, however, we focus mainly
on the competition-enhancing affects of quotas.
We begin studying the equilibrium with quotas by analyzing the
punishments for deviating from the Implicitly collusive understanding. As is
standard practice in models of repeated oligopoly (see for example, Friedman
(1971), ltotemberg and Saloner (1986) and Brook and Scheinkman (1986)) we assume
that firms revert to the Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game ifany firm
deviates from the collusive understanding. This is in contrast to Abreu (1982)
who focuses Instead on the maximal feasible punishment for any deviating firm.
While, as we show below, our results are not very sensitive to our assumption of
one-shot Nash punishments, there are three reasons why these may be preferable
even when they are lower than the maximal punishments. First, if the owners of
the firm can sell the firm forward, the only equilibrium until the sale takes
place is the one-shot Nash equilibrium.7 Second, it is in the interest of the
managers of the firm to signal, once punishments begin, that they are unwilling
to post prices other than those of the one-shot Nash equilibrium. If this
signalling is credible maximal punishments as in Abreu (1982) become
infeasible.8 Third, the one-shot Nashequilibrium is easier to characterize
than the maximal punishments.
The static one-shot game to which firms revert when they are punishing each
other has no pure strategy equilibrium. Xreps and Scheinkman (1983) analyze the
mixed strategy equilibrium, and compute the expected profits of the firm with
larger capacity. They also exhibit one such mixed strategy equilibrium (for
which they compute the entire distribution of prices). It is straightforward to
show that this equffibrium is the unique mixed strategy equilibrium and thus to9
also compute the expected profits of the foreign firm at this equilibrium.
We now list the salient features of this equilibrium. The arguments behind
these assertions are contained in the appendix:
(i)The highest price charged by both firms is [a+c-t(a-c)]/2.
(U) The lowest price charged is
c=(a+c)/2
-(a—c)(2r-e2)1"2/2 (2)
andit is charged by both firms with probability zero
(111) In equilibrium,the domesticfirm has expected profits of (a-c)2(1-
per period while those of the foreign firm equal s(o-c)(a-c)/b.
Notice that this static equilibrium has the features of the differentiated
products model of Krishna (1986). A higher quota (a higher c) lowers boththe
highest and lowest price charged. Kreps and Schelnkman (1984) show that the
entire distribution of prices is stochasticaliy dominated by that with a lower
quota.
There is one more feature of this punishment equilibrium that deserves
comment. At this equilibrium the domestic finn earns a present value of (a-
c)2(1-s)2/4b(1-6). What must be noted is that the domestic finn can never earn
less than this present discounted value of profits at any equflibrum; even the
one involving maximal punishments. The reason for this is that the domestic
firm can guarantee for itself that it will earn (a-c)2(1-c)2/4b per period by
posting a price equal to ia+c-c(a-c)I/2b. This limit on the punishability of
the domestic firm is what gives quotas their ability to break the monopoly
price.
With the value of the punishments in hand we now turn to the analysis of
the repeated game. The price preferred by the domestic firm continues to be
(a+c) /2 while the foreign finn, which is subject to a quota, naturally prefers a
higher price. Yet we concentrate on the question of whether the duopoly can10
sustain the "monopoly" price of (a+c)/2. We do this for two related reasons.
First, higher prices are more difficult to sustain so that if the firms cannot
sustain (a+c)/2 they cannot sustain any higher price. Second, we are interested
In whether the introduction of a quota lowers equilibrium prices from their free
trade level of (a+c)/2.
The sustainability of the price (a+c)/2 depends on the amount the foreign
firm is expected to sell at this price.If, for Instance, the foreign firm is
allowed to sell its entire quota, c(a-c)/b, at this price the foreign firm will
have no incentive to deviate. In this case, the domestic firm will always
deviate since it earns more in the static game, Similarly, If the foreign firm
is expected to sell nothing, the domestic firm never deviates but the foreign
firm always aeviates. So, we consider the Intermediate case in which the
foreign firm is supposed to sell p(a-c)/b (O<wC1)Inthe collusive arrangement.
Then, by going along with the collusive arrangement, its profits are p(a-
c)2/2b. Instead, if it deviates by undercutting the price slightly, it sells
either total demand or its entire quota at a price essentially Identical to
(a÷c)/2. We analyze separately the case in which c is smaller than or equal to
1/2, in which case it sells its entire quota, and the case In which it exceeds
1/2, in which case It sells (a-c)/2b.
Consider first the former case. By deviating, the foreign firm earns c (a-
c)2/2b. It will thus choose to deviate unless:
—p)!2￿SEp
—t + c(2c—s2)1"2J/2(1-6) (3)
or:
TI￿ c-öt(2t - t2)12. (4)11
Note that for small c, iimustessentially equal c. The Foreign firm knows
that the price wifi roughly equal (a+c)/2 whether it goes along or Is being
punished9. Thus it deviates unless It is allowed to sell essentially its entire
capacity. Note also that the higher is the firms' discount factor, 6, the less
the foreign firm is willing to sell without cheating.
Now consider the domestic firm.If it goes along it sells (a-c) (1/2 -
atthe monopoly price of (a+c)/2, while if it cheats it can sell (a-c)/2b at
that price. On the other hand it earns only (a-c)2(1-c)2/4b per period after
cheating. Thus the domestic firm is deterred from price-undercutting If:
p/2 ￿ [s/2 -p/2 - t2/41/(1-6)
or:
i￿Ot —6s2/2. (5)
Equation (5), which is valid also when punishments are maximal, shows that
p must be relatively small If the domestic firm is to be deterred from cheating
since higher levels of is make cheating more attractive without Increasing its
cost to the firm.
If (4) and (5) contradict one another the monopoly price is not






Fore small enough we can neglect the term In square brackets (which is of
second order) and the condition is clearly violated. When c is small enough we
saw that the foreign firm must be allowed to sell essentially its entire quota.
But the domestic firm always requires that p be smaller than öcwhichis
strictly smaller than C;forp equal to tithas too strong an Incentive to
undercut the monopoly price10.
For s between 0 and 1 the term In brackets is positive. The term Insquare
bracketsIs Increasing in e untilc reaches .553. Yet this analysis is only
relevant for c up to 1/2 sincebeyondthis the foreign firm cannot sell its
entire quota when it cheats. For this maximal applicable c, 6 must exceed about
.62 for (6) to be satisfied.
Now consider the case in which exceeds 1/2 so that when the foreign firm
cheats it earns (a-c)2/4b. Then the foreign firm will cheat unless:




whichmust now be satisfied together with (5) for monopolization to be feasible.
So we substitute (7) (holding with equality)In(5) and obtain:
(1—6)/2 S Oe(2c —c2)1"2-6c2/2. (8)
For s equalone,that is when the foreignfirm cansell the entire quantity
demanded at the competitiveprice, (8) requires that 6exceed 1/2 as it did13
under free trade. Since the RHS of (8) is strictly increasing in e, the level
of 51(1-6) (and thus of 6) required to make (8) hold, falls strictly when c
rises.
To summarize the results of this section, more restrictive quotas (starting
at a quota which allows the foreign firm to sell the entire amount demanded at
the competitive price) monotonically reduce the ability to monopolize the
market. Note that, for a given 6, the quota that gives the minimum price In the
domestic market Is strictly smaller than the one which satisfies (6) (or (8))
with equality. When these equations hold with equality, monopoly Is Just
sustainable. For lower values of e, the price falls. However, If the quota is
reduced significantly more, the price starts rising again as the prices charged
even in the one-shot game rise. Forequal to zero, the monopoly price is
reestablished.
It must be pointed out again that the increased competition brought about
by quotas is not sensitive to the use of one-shot Nash punishments. For
instance even if deviations by the foreign firm lead this firm to earn zero
profits from then on (which for low r is a much harsher punishment than the
maximal punishment) the foreign firm will require that p equal at least (1-6)z
so as to refrain from deviating. This is inconsistent with (5) for 6 equal to
1/2 and any positive c.
The increased competition brought about by quotas in this setting is in
direct contrast to the conclusions of the static analysis reported by Krishna
(1985). We now briefly compare the results to those one would obtain when
analyzing tariffs In a similar setting. A tariff simply implies that the costs
of the foreign firm are higher, by the tariff rate, than the costs of the
domestic firm. The repeated game in which the two finns have different costs
has been analyzed by Beruhelm and Whlnston (1986), who consider optimal14
punishments in the style of Abreu (1982). Then, both the domestic and foreign
firms stifi earn zero profits when they are being punished11. This means that
the incentives to participate In the implicit agreement that requires that the
price (a+c)/2 be charged, do not change as a result of the tariff. Moreover
Bernheim and Whlnston (1986) show that the equilibrium that involves the highest
profits for the duopoly as a whole now has a price higher than (a+e)/2. This
occurs because the profit maximizing price from the point of view of the foreign
firm Is now higher. So a tariff has the potential for increasing the domestic
price above the monopoly price.
Thus, in the case of maximal punishments the classic results of Bhagwati
(1965) about competition between a foreign and a domestic firm, are precisely
reversed. A quota, because it makes it Impossible for the domestic firm to be
punished effectively, makes it difficult to collude, while a tariff has no such
consequence. This raises the Intriguing possibility that this is the reason
governments seem to prefer quantitative restrictions to tariffs12.
However, It must be pointed out that the robustness of the monopoly outcome
with respect to a tariff is sensitive to the use of maximal punishments. If
instead, reversions to the Bertrand outcome are used, a tariff which raises the
foreign fthn's costs barely below the monopoly price of (a+c)72 makes the
monopoly price unsustainable. The reason for this is that to maintain this
price the domestic firm must give a sizeable fraction of the market (1-6) to the
foreign firm. Thus if the foreign firm's costs are near (a+c)/2 the domestic
firm wifi actuaUy earn more during the period of punishment (when it charges a
price barely below the foreign firm's costs) than when it goes along with the
monopoly price.
The results of this section are sufficiently striking that they deserve to
be qualified somewhat further. The analysis hinges critically on the presence15
of only one domestic firm. Since this means that only the foreign firm can
punish the domestic finn, this punishment ability is curtailed in the presence
of a quota. If there were more domestic firms in the market, they could all
revert to a price of c if any of them deviated and thus keep the oligopoly at
the monopoly outcome even in the presence of a quota. On the other hand, if the
domestic finns are capable of concerted cheating, the approximation considered
In this section of only one domestic firm may be a good one.
III Quotas and quantity competition at home
In this section we assume that quantities are the strategic variables.
This has two consequences. First, neither firm eliminates the sales of its
competitor when it deviates. These are maintained at the implicitly colluding
amount. Second, punishments are characterized by reversion to the single period
Nash equilibrium in quantities, which is a much milder form of punishment than
when prices are the strategic variables
The results of this section are directly comparable to Davidson's (1984)
analysis of tariffs, In which he also assumes that quantities are the strategic
variables. We show that the result that quotas lead to less sustainability of
collusion now only holds for very restrictive quotas that allow the foreign firm
to import very little. For larger quotas, we find that collusion is, if
anything, enhanced by the quota. Thus our results here are similar to
Davidson's (1984) since he shows that small tariffs (which correspond to large
quotas) enhance collusion while large tariffs do the opposite.
Again, the finns are assumed to be able to monopolize the domestic market
in the absence of quotas. By going along with selling (a-c)/4b each, each firm
earns (a-c)2/8b.If eitherfirm were to deviate It would choose to soil 3(a-16
c)/8b which would give it profits of 9(a-c)2/64b in the period of the deviation.
Prom then on, the finns would revert to Cournot-Nash equilibrium so that each
would sell (a-c)13bandearn profits of (a-c)2/Sb per period. So, each firm
will be deterred from cheating if:
19/64
-1/8](a-c)2/b￿ ÔL1/8 -
whichrequires only that exceed 9/17.
Now consider a quota of c(a-c)/b. Ifis above 3/8, so that the quota
exceeds the best response to the monopolizing level of output, it has no effect.
So suppose that it is lower than this level but higher than the Nash equilibrium
level of sales, i.e. that c Is between 3/8 and 1/3. Then the quota does not
affect the foreign firm's ability to punish the domestic firm from deviating
(since each firm produces (a-c)/3b in Cournot-Nash equilibrium. However, it
makes the foreign finn's own deviation less profitable since this deviation
cannot now exceed t(a-c)/b. So such a quota has no effect when the firms can
sustain the monopolistic outcome without a quota. Furthermore, it actually may
make it possible to sustain this monopolistic outcome even when this cannot be
done in the absence of a quota. For suppose that 6 is just below 9/17 so that
the collusive output is not sustainable in the absence of a quota. With s
between 3/8 and 1/3 the foreign firm Is not only willing to go along with
selling (a-c)/4b, since it now earns less when it deviates than It does if it
isn't constrained, it will stifi not be Induced to cheat even if Its sales are
somewhat lower. This means that It may be possible to sustain the monopoly
output by having the foreign firm produce less than half of the total, and the
domestic firm produce more than half. In essence, the "excess" unwillingness to
cheat on the part of the foreign firm can be used to free up the constraint on17
thedomestic firm.
Thus for a quota to promote competition it must be below the Nash
equilibrium (a-c)/3b, c must be less than 1/3. We now analyze such a quota in
detail. We first look for the lowest level of sales on the part of the foreign
firm which makes it willing to go along with an equilibrium whose price is
(a+c)/2. Then we analyte whether the domestic firm is willing to go along with
this price given these sales by the foreign firm.
Suppose that the foreign firm is supposed to sell p(a-c)/b in equffibriuni
and that the firms attempt to sustain the monopoly level of output. We now
derive the minimum level of p for which the foreign firm will not want to
deviate. By cooperating it sells its output at a price of (ac)/2 so that it
earns (a-c)2w'2b. The domestic finn sells that portion of the monopoly output
not sold by the foreign firm, or (a-c)(1/2 -p)Ib. Weshow below that the
requirement that s be smaller than 1/3 implies that when the foreign firm
deviates it sells c(a-c)/b. Thus when it deviates it earns (a-c)2e(1/2 - +
ii) /b.Note that the profits to the foreign firm when it deviates are increasing
In ji.Thisis becausethe higheris p the lower are the domestic finn's sales
when they both go alongwiththe proposed equilibrium output.
After its deviation the market reverts to the equilibrium in the one-shot
game. Since the quota is less than the Nash equilibrium value of (a-c)/3b, the
foreign firm sells c(a-c)/b while the domestic firm sells its best response to
this level of output, or (A-c) (1-s)/2b. Thus the foreign firm earns (a-c)2e(1-
e)/2b. Hence the foreign firm will be deterred from deviating if:
(a-c)2{c[1/2+ii -- p12)/b￿ 6(a-c)2[p -c(1-s)3/2b(1-6)
i.e. if:18
2 14
p￿ £- óc/1 -2r(1—6)] (9)
Note that for values of c near zero, the foreign firm will deviate unless
the implicit agreement allows It to sell nearly Its entire quota. The reason
for this is that when the quota is small, price does not differ appreciably from
(a+c)/2, even during the punishment phase. Then It is always In the foreign
firm's Interest to sell as much as it can and it cannot be deterred from
deviating unless It is allowed to sell essentially its entire quota. This means
that for sufficiently small £theforeign finn has no punishment power since it
is already selling all that it is allowed to bring In. Given this, It is not
surprising that we establish next that for sufficiently small c, the equilibrium
cannot involve the monopolization of the domestic market.
Consider the domestic firm's incentive to deviate. Suppose that the
foreign finn is selling (a-c)x/b as above. The domestic firm would sell its
best response to tMs, (a-c)(1-p)/2b,Ifit deviated.It would then earn (a-
c)2(1-p)2/4b In the period In which it deviated. Prom thenon the foreign firm
would sell (a-c)E/b so that, by an argument similar to that above, the domestic
firm would earn (a-c)2(1-c)2/4b per period.
So the domestic firm would be deterred from deviating only if:
(1 -p)2/4-(1/4-p/2)￿
6[1/4 -i/2-(1-£)2/41/(1_). (10)
It is easy to see that in spite of the fact that profits from deviating
increase when p falls, the inequality in (10) is more lilcely to hold the smaller
is p, as long as p is smaller than 81(1-6) (which is true by assumption). The19
reason for this is that the principal effect of a decrease In p is that the
domestic finn earns more by going along with the eoUusive agreement. Thus to
make the domestic firm as willing to go along as possible we let the foreign
firm sell only as much as is required to make (9) hold with equality.
Substituting this expression for p in (10), multiplying by (16)[1_2(16)]2 and
collecting terms, the inequality (10) becomes:
£2(1_262) —c3(1—6)[4(1—62)+26j
+t4(1—ö)[4(1—8)+46(1—6)+￿o. (11)
If we divide this expression byand take the limit as c goes to zero we
obtain (1_262)￿0, which requires 6 smaller than about .71. Furthermore, the LHS
of (11) (after dividing by £2) decreases monotonically with c in the relevant
range of t.Thismeans that If 6 exceeds .71 It is always possible to sustain
the monopoly price.
If, instead,6 is between 9/17 and .71, the monopolistic outcome is
sustainable with free trade but not with a sufficiently small quota. In this
case of linear demand, however, the quota must be very small for this result to
hold.If we take the smallest discount factor consistent with collusion under
free trade (9/17), one can demonstrate numerically that the monopolistic outcome
is not sustainable for c equal to .01butis sustainable for c equal to .015.
These are such low values of s that even the noncooperative solution looks
essentially identical to the monopolistic solution.
IV Quotas and competition abroad: Constant demand
We now turn to the implications of the existence of a quota at home for20
competition abroad. In this section we adapt the arguments presented in
Sections II and III to argue that under certain circumstancesthey can be
interpreted as providing conditions under which competition increases abroad.
We assume that the domestic and foreign markets are identicalso that their
demand curves are given by (1).If both firms have infinite capacity, there is
a monopolistic equilibrium in which (a+c)/2 is charged in both marketsas long
as aequalsat least 1/2 when prices are the strategic variables and 6 equals at
least 9/17 when quantities are strategic variables.
Now assume that the domestic finn actually has limitedcapacity given by
k(a-c)/b. So marginal cost equals c until the firm produces k(a-c)/b and then
becomes infinite.If Ic equals 2, for instance, the domestic firm cansupply the
quantity demanded at the competitive price In both markets. The idea of this
section is that this capacity is sufficient to maintain the monopolistic outcome
in both countries with free trade. However, with a quota that forbids all
Imports into the domestic country, the domestic finn must devote a larger
fraction of its capacity to producing for the protected domestic market. It
then effectively has a very small capacity for selling abroad. This has the
same effect abroad as would a quota imposed by the foreign country.
We first treat the case in which prices are the strategic variables. If 6
is equal to 1/2 (the benchmark case) and k is less than 2, the two finnscannot
maintain the monopolistic outcome in both markets even in the absence ofa
quota. This results because the domestic firm does not have sufficient
punishment power to keep the foreign firm from cheating. Thus the monopoly
outcome can at best be sustained for values of 6 that aregreater than that
required to sustain monopoly under free trade without capacity constraints-
Weconsider how large the "critical" value of 8 must be for different
values of k. Note first that k must be at least equal to 1/2 for theproblem to21
be interesting since otherwise the domestic country Is unable to meet demand in
its own market when that market becomes closed to foreign firms. So first
suppose that k is barely above 1/2. Then we can use (6) withequal to k/2
(theworld market is equivalent to twice the domestic market) to obtain the
value of 6 for which the monopoly outcome Is sustainable In the world as a
whole. This value of 6 is about .65.If instead Ic is equal to one, the
critical value of 6 is about .62.
Now consider the effect of a quota. The domestic firm sells (a-c)/2b at
home and has (k-1/2) (a-c)/b units left over to sell in the foreign country.
What is important to notice is that the domestic firm is never willing to sell
more that (k-1/2) (a-c)/b units abroad, even when It is punishing the foreign
firm for deviating. This is so because the marginal revenue from selling a unit
at home always exceeds the marginal revenue from selling It abroad If less than
(a-c)/2b is sold at home. This means that the domestic firm is effectively
capacity constrained abroad with a capacity of (k-1/2) (a-c)/b. Letting k-1/2 be
denoted by c we can use (6) (or (8) for k bigger than 1) to discover the minimum
value of 6 that sustains the monopoly outcome abroad. Por k barely above 1/2 no
value of 6 strictly below 1 is sufficient to maintain that outcome (in contrast
to a value of .65 in the absence of a quota). For Ic equal to 1, a value of .65
is required when only .62 was required under free trade.
We now turn to the case in which quantities are the strategic variables.
Here the monopoly outcome only broke down for tiny quotas. Hence if the
domestic finn has a capacity of (1/2 +c) where c is negligible, the monopoly
outcome can be maintained with free trade as long as 6 exceeds 9/17. On the
other hand, once the domestic market is dosed to the foreign firm, the domestic
firm is willing to sell at most abroad. This means that for tsmallenough if
6 Is below .71, the monopoly outcome won't be sustainable abroad.22
V Quotas and competition abroad: Fluctuating demand
This section considers a somewhat different model in whicha quota in one
country tends to Increase competition in the other country. The idea is that
collusion is maintained under free trade only because whenever thenet benefits
from cheating are big in one market, they are small In the othermarket and
viceversa. In this setting, the overall incentive to cheat(taking the two
markets together) are fairly constant over time.If one looks at either market
separately, however, the incentive to cheat fluctuates over time. Thenif, as
in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), future punishmentsare largely independent of
the current period's Incentive to cheat, then thosepunishments may be
insufficient to deter cheating If the current incentive to cheat isparticularly
high.It thus becomes more difficult to prevent them fromcheating. Since the
imposition of a quota has the effect of separating the two markets, It thus
makes implicit collusion more difficult.
Our specific model assumes that demand is random in bothcountries, as in
Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), and negatively correlated across marketsas in
Bernheim and Whinston (1986). To simplify theanalysis we assume that there are
only two states of demand (high and low) whose realizationsare independently
distributed over time In any one country and perfectlynegatively correlated
across markets. So when demand is high in one market it is low in the other.15
In this section we assume that there are Nfl firms lxi each marketwhile we
do not restrict attention to linear demandcurves. Since the countries are
symmetric, the monopoly price in the high state, Pu, is the same In both
countries and similarly for the monopoly price in the low ,p'.We start
the analysis by ensuring that these two prices p" and p1are sustainable with23
free trade. That is we consider a situation in which all N firms sell in both
markets and derive the condition under which no single firm wants to deviate
from charging Pu In the country in which demand Is high and p' in the other.
Prices are again the strategic variable so that any deviation triggers a
permanent reversion to the static equfflbriuin in which price equals marginal
cost.
Let u be the total monopoly profits In the market with high demand and
those in the market With low demand. As long as p' exceeds marginal cost, the
former is bigger than the latter since the monopoly always has the option of
charging p' even when demand is high. A firm that deviates from the monopoly
outcome undercuts the price charged by the others sllghuy. It thus earnsin
the market in which demand is high andin the other. On the other hand, by
deviating it gives up both now and in all future periods its share (1/N) of
theseprofits.Thus each finn is deterred from deviating as long as:
(ITu +i,1)(1-1/N)S 6(l,U + ii')/N(l -6) (12)
or:
N-1￿6/(1-6). (13)
Weassume that either the number of firms is small enough or the discount
factor big enough that (12) holds so that with free trade the two markets can be
completely monopolized.
We now consider what happens when no Imports are allowed into the domestic
country. This drastic quota has two effects. First, It means that there are
fewer (N/2) active firms in the domestic market while N firms continue to sell24
in the foreign market. As a result, the conditions under whichmonopoly wifi be
sustainable wifi be different dependingonwhich market has high demand. As
ltotemberg and Saloner (1986) show, in this setting It is always easier to
sustain collusion when demand is low. Thus to see whether complete
monopolization is possible, we study the conditions under which such
monopolization is possible in the high demand state.
Consider first the foreign country when demand is high. Suppose that the
firms try to charge p". Any firm that undercuts this pric earns iru instead of
Vu/N abroad. The losses from the ensuingcompetition are smaller for foreign
countries since domestic countries may also lose any profits they make at home.
So we concentrate on the Incentive to deviate of foreign firms.Jf they deviate
they lose the expected value of profits In the future. Since demand is
Independently distributed over time, these expacted profits equal (lTU+l)/2.
So, a foreign finn will deviate If:
-1/N)>6(,u+ir')/2N(1-O). (14)
Notethat the RHS of (14) equals half the ItliS of (12). The costs In terms
of foregone future profits from deviating are half what they would be Ifforeign
firms had access to both markets. Yet, Insofar as 7r isbigger than ir1, the LUS
of (14) is bigger than half of the LHS of (12) so that it Ispossible for (12)
and(14) to hold simultaneously. In particular, if (12) holds as an equality
(so that monopolization is just sustainable with free trade) then If theprofits
In the high and 'ow demand states are different, theinequality in (14) is
always satisfied. When (14) holds, it is impossible to sustain monopoly abroad
in the high state of demand so the quota Increasescompetition.
It is easy to show that when (12) holds It is always possible to sustain25
monopoly abroad in the low state of demand. This results from the fact that
(12) ensures that deviations will not take place even when demand is constant.
Yet, when demand is low, expected future losses from deviating exceed those that
would prevail if demand were expected to stay low forever. This In turn results
from the fact that even when (14) holds, it is stifi possible to sustain
substantial profits in the high state. This can be seen as follows: Let the
sustainable price (the highest price that can be charged without inducing any
firm to deviate) In the high state be p5 and the ensuing profits 1r5. Then by an
argument analogous to the one used to derive (14), a foreign firm will just





sothat ?equals¶1when(12) holds as an equality and exceeds itwhenitholds
asa strict inequality.
So far, we have shown that under plausible conditions the foreign market
becomes more competitive while stifi retaining substantial profits. This result
does not hinge on the fact that prices are used as the strategic variables. As
in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986), it only requires that collusion be difficult to
sustain when demand is high. As we showed there,this is also true when
quantities are the strategic variables when demand is linear.
We now turn briefly to an analysis of the domestic market. If domestic
firms were to deviate from the collusive arrangement they could be punished In26
both markets. In this case, deviating firms would deviate In both markets at
once. On the other hand we have already derived the net benefits from deviating
abroad under the assumption that punishments would only be meted out abroad.To
complete the analysis we thus look at the net benefits from deviating in the
domestic market alone under the assumption that firms will only bepunished in
the domestic market for doing so. Then, the total net benefits todeviating are
thesumof these two net benefits.
Suppose that the domestic market is fully monopolized. When demand is
high, a deviating firm would earninstead of Its share (2/N) of t'.Itwould
then lose Its share of total expected profits in its own market from thenon.
It would thus be deterred from deviating if:
-2/N)￿ 6(U+ )/N(1-6) (16)
The RES of (16) is the same as the RHS of (12)While the punishment is
meted out only in one market, the share of each firm In this market is double
the share we previously considered. On the other hand the LHS of(16) is
substantially smaller than the LHS of (12) since deviations are taking place in
one market alone while, In addition, the net benefit is smaller because there
are fewer firms active in the market and so the finn's share was larger to start
with. So if (12) is satisfied (even with equality) then (16) Is satisfiedas a
strict inequality. This applies to the case in which demand Is high at home.
In this case demand is low in the foreign market and ourprevious analysis
showing that there is a net loss from deviating then applies. Thus if
monopoly is sustainable in the absence of a quota when demand is high in the
home market, then it is also sustainable with the quota.
When demand is low at home the corresponding condition at home has thesame27
RHS as (16) but an even smaller LHS. So the net benefits to deviating are
negative here as well.
In summary, when (12) holds, monopolization is always possible in the
protected domestic market. Indeed, since protected domestic firms strictly
prefer to go along with monopolization than to deviate when (12) holds as an
equality, we can conclude that protection may make monopolization feasible at
home when it was not feasible with free trade.
The fact that collusion becomes easier for the domestic firms has the
potential, in a richer model, to make monopolization feasible abroad as well.
To do this we must allow the set of firms that charge the lowest price to split
the market unevenly as is done in Bernheim and Whinston (1986) and as we do in
Section II. Bernheim and Whinston (1986) show that the possibility of such
arbitrary divisions allows "punishment power" to be shifted from a market in
which there is more than enough to one in which there isn't enough to sustain
monopoly outcomes. In our example, the domestic finns can offer the foreign
firms a share higher than 1/N of the foreign market. Domestic firms would
tolerate this for fear of losing their domestic profits if they deviate abroad.
Foreign firms would earn more when they go along with the collusive arrangement
and thus would be less willing to deviate. In this way monopolization is
potentially achievable when demand fluctuates relatively little. This approach
does not work, however, when N is equal to 2 so that as in Sections II and III
there is only one firm in the domestic market. Then this firm does not need to
fear retaliation at home when it deviates abroad. Its incentives to deviate
abroadarethe same as those of foreign firms and giving the foreign finn a
disproportionately large market share only increases the domestic flrmts
incentive to deviate abroad.28
VI Quotas and Competition in Both Markets
In thissectionwe consider the possibility that a quota willincrease
competition at home (as in Sections II and III) as well as abroad (as in
Sections JV and V). The model we use to ifiustrate this possibility is the
fluctuating demand model of Section V except that, to permit competition to
increase at home, we consider a strictly positive quota. Also, to simplify the
analysis we restrict attention to the case in which N equals 2, so that there is
one firm in each country, and 6 is equal to 1/2, so that monopoly is just
sustainable in both markets with free trade.
Since any firm that deviates in one market will be punished in both, any
deviating firm will undercut the implicitly agreed upon price In both countries.
So the incentive to deviate in any one country can be thought of as the sum of
the net profits from deviating at home (i.e. the benefits from deviating at home
minus the present value of the losses at home) plus the net profits from
deviating abroad.
Suppose that the foreign firm has a share a of the foreign market. Then
its net profits from cheating when demand is low are (13a/2)r1air/2 while
those when demand is high are (1-3u/2),r-rcT&2. Similarly the domestic firm's
net profits from cheating when demand is low are (3a/2-1/2)1J-(1-a)1r/2 and
those when demand Is high are (3a/2-1/2)r1-(1-a),/2. The important thing to
notice is that, as we increase a, the foreign firmts net profits from deviating
fall by the same amount as the domestic profits from deviating increase. Thus,
as long as in each state the total net profits from deviating (the sum of each
firm's net profits from deviating) are zero, there wifi always be a
redistribution of shares that will make both firms willing to go along.
We therefore now concentrate only on the total incentive to deviate. In29
the foreign country this is (1!1_1?)/2 in the low state and (1T,))/2 in the high
state. So unless ¶Tisequal tothe total incentive to deviate is positive
abroad in one of the two states.
Suppose demand at home is given by P=a1-bQ (where I equals either u or 1).
We can then write the quota in state I as equal to e1(at-c)/b where if the quota
is small enoughIs less than 1/2. Suppose that at the monopoly price the
foreign firm is allowed to sell pi(aic)/b. Then we can obtain from (4) the
foreign firm's net profits from deviating while from (5) we can obtain the
domestic firm's net profits from deviating. Once again by varying p1 one firm's
decreased incentive to deviate Is the other's increased Incentive so we can
focus on the total incentive to deviate. This is given by:
(at—c)2[c1(1—6) +6t12/2 — &s1(2Ei_c2)l/'2]/b. (17)
Note that the condition that (17) be positive Is the same as that (6) be
violated which we proved for the case in which 6 is equal to 1/2 in Section II.
There is thus a net incentive to deviate in the domestic market.
Now consider the net incentive to deviate In the two markets taken together
if we try to maintain monopoly at home. This is given by (itS- i?) plusthe
expression in (17) wIth i replaced by 1 when demand is high abroad. It is given
by (yl5) plus the expression In (17) with i replaced by u when demand is low
abroad. At least one of these net Incentives is positive so that it is
Impossible to sustain monopoly at home.
Now we consider whether it is possible to have an outcome different from
the monopoly outcome at home such that the net incentive to deviate at home is
so negative that the monopoly outcome can be maintained abroad even in the high
state. That this is unlikely for small quotas should be apparent since, then,30
the static gamegivesabout as many profits as the monopoly outcome. This
suggests that there are no prices between the monopoly price and those that
prevail under static competition for which the costs of reverting to competition
are high.
We now consider this issue more formally. We consider a price p at home
and study the overall profits from deviating at home. The amount demanded at
this price is (a-p)/b and, since the distribution of this demand across finns is
immaterial, we let the foreign firm sell c1(a1-c)/b while the domestic firm
sells the difference between the quantity demanded and the quota. The domestic
flrms net profits from deviating are then given by:
—(p—c)(a1—p)-s(a1—c)]/b+(a1-c)2(1-c')2/4b.
The foreign firm gains nothing by cheating but its cost from reversion to
the static game is:
iic (a-c)[p -aJ/b
so that the overall benefits from deviating are:
(p-c) (e'(a'-c) -(a1-pfl/b+(a'-c)2(1-r1)2/4b+£1(at-c)(a-c)/b




whichis negligiblefor small c. The fact that (18) is small means that the
maximmn costfromdeviating at home, 0, is small.Yet,maximumprofitsin the
highstate abroadmust satisfy:
(5 -111)12 - 0￿ 0
sothatfor smallit is Impossibleto make ¶5equalto,1m as wouldbe required
tomonopolize theforeign market.
VII. Conclusions
We have shown In a variety of models in which implicit collusion is
Important that quotas have the potential of increasing competition, not just in
the domestic market, but also abroad. These results stand In sharp contrast to
those obtained when there is a single domestic firm and goods from abroad are
supplied competitively (Bhagwatl (1965)) as well as those obtained when domestic
and foreign firms act as in a one-shot game.
The intuition underlying our seemingly paradoxical results are not
restricted to quotas. Indeed, any action by the government which makes
competition when collusion breaks down more profitable makes collusion itself
less viable. Thus Government imposed minimum price floors could have precisely
the same effect.
One natural question to ask is whether our results depend critically on the
existence of implicit collusion or whether they can also be generated In other
models of strategic Interaction. One particular concern is how our results
would be modified In the presence of entry.
In this conclusion we sketch an argument that shows that quotas also tend32
to Increase competition by encouraging the entry of new (domestic) firms into
the Industry. The setting we consider is very closely related to thatdeveloped
in Dixit and Kyle (1985). They analyze an industry with an establishedforeign
firm and a domestic potential entrant. They show that It is possible that If
the domestic country prohibits imports that there will be morecompetition In
theforeignmarket. This occurs because the potential domestic firmmay find it
unprofitable to enter if it must compete with the foreign firm in both markets.
By protecting it in the domestic market (while It competes in the foreign
market), the domestic government provides it with sufficient revenues to cover
its fixed costs.It then finds entry attractive, enters, and increases
competition abroad. Since the domestic market was monopolized in any event, the
domestic country is made better off since consumer surplus is unaffected and
rents have been shifted towards the domestic country.
This analysis can easily be extended to include the case of anonzero
quota. Moreover, in that case, not only does competition Increase abroad, but
it increases in the domestic country as well. Consider the case where the firms
compete with outputs as their strategic variables if entry occurs. Suppose
further that the domestic potential entrant will find entry worthwhile if it
earns its competitive revenues abroad plus some amount, K, of revenues in the
domestic market; where K is greater than its domestic Cournot revenues and less
than the domestic monopoly revenues. Now let the domestic governmentimpose a
quota which is such that the domestic firm earns revenues of K when it produces
Its best-response to the quota. In that case the potential entrant is willing
to enter and does so. Once it has entered the firms produce their Cournot
outputs in the foreign market, and in the domestic market the Foreign firm sells
its quota while the domestic firm sells its best-response to that. Competition
increases in both countries. 1633
The Dixit and Kyie (1985) Insight is that the domestic country may have to
protect its domestic firm in order to encourage it to enter. However, what the
aboveanalysispoints out, is that the domestic firm may not need complete
insulation in its own market In which case domestic welfare can be improved even
further by allowing some foreign competition.
In contrast to our analysis in Section II, this result holds whether the
instrument used by the domestic country is a quota or a tariff.All that is
required is that the domestic government increase the domestic profits of the
domestic potential entrant to the point where entry is attractive. Since a
tariff raises the costs of the foreign firm, they make it "less aggressive" In
the domestic market which in turn makes that market more attractive to the
potential entrant.
Thus when considerations of implicit collusion or of potential entry are
important, quotas can lead to greater competitiveness.34
APPENDIX
In this appendix we consider the one-shot game in which prices are the
strategic variables and In which one of the firms is capacity constrained. We
establish the claims made In the text, namely that:
(1)The highest price charged by both firms is:
s [a +c-t(a—c)J/2
(ii) The lowest price charged is:
a =(a+c)/2-
andthis lowest price is charged by bothfirmswith probability zero
(Iii)In equilibrium, the foreign firm earns t(a-c)(a-c)/b.
We discuss each of these in turn:
Ci) The highest price charted by both firms is s
First note that, given that the foreign ffrm can only sell less than
the domestic firm, it wifi never choose to charge a price higher than the
highest price charged by the domestic finn.Hencethe domestic finn knows that
when it charges Its highest price, it will be undercut with probability one.
But the price that maximizes Its profits when It is undercut for sure iss,
which Is therefore the highest price charged by the domestic firm.
(ii)Thelowest price charged is a =(a+c/2-(a-c)(2c-c2)1/2/2and (iii)In
equilibrium, the foreign firm earns t(a-dlla-c)/b.
Consider the lowest price (c) which the domestic firm would be willing
to charge if it could thereby be sure to capture the entire market (i.e.
undercut the foreign firm). This price a has a number of interesting
properties. First, itcannotbe the case in an equilibrium that the foreign
firm always charges a price strictlyabovea. If It did so the domestic firm
would always make more than its profits at s by charging a price between a and35
thelowest price charged by the foreign firm, which contradicts the fact that s
is Its highest price. Secondly, If a is the lowest price charged by the
domestic firm, it cannot be charged with positive probability since that would
mean that the foreign firm would benefit from undercutting it with positive
probability. This would imply that the domestic finn couldn't expect to capture
all of demand at a so that it would be unwilling to charge a. On the other hand
unless a is the lowest price charged by the domestic finn, the foreign firm (who
seeks only to undercut the domestic firm) would never charge a price of a. So a
must be lowest price charged by the domestic firm who charges it with zero
probability.
Since the foreign firm must make equal expected profits at all the
prices It charges In equilibrium we can compute its expected profits simply by
computing its profits when It charges a.Whenit does this is is assured of
being able to sell Its entire quota so these profits equal t(a-c)(a-c) /b.
If the domestic firm is sure to sell the entire demand given by (1),
its profits from charging a price p are given by:
(p-c)(a-p)/b =(a-c)2/4b-[p-(a+c)/2]2/b (Al)
2 2 17 which must equal (a-c) (1-c) /4b at a price of a. So a equals
a(a+c)/2 —(a-c)(2e-c2)1"2/2. (A2)36
FOOTNOTES
1 This is proven by K?ookerjee and Ray (1986) and Bernhebn and Whinston (1986)
2 The notion of segmented markets is discussed, for the case of static
imperfectly competitive models, In Helpman (1982).
3 Par the specific demand and cast functions used here it Is presented, far
instance, in Rotemberg and Saloner (1986).
4 The first of these assumptions is not restrictive since, with constant
demand, if the firms can sustain any collusive outcome, they can also sustain
themonopolyoutcome. The second assumption is the division of the spoils that
makesiteasiestto collude.
5Each individual firm is able toresista larger temptation todeviateif the
punishmentis large.Thuscollusion is easier the larger is the punishment.
This is what leads Abreu (1982) to focus on the maximal possible punishments.
S The ability of tariffs to shift rents from foreign to domestic firms is
considered in a static model by Brander and Spencer (1985).
7 In other words, following a deviation, the owner of the deviating firm signs
a contract to pass ownership of the finn to a third party for a nominal fee
(which can even be less than the scrap value of the plant). The contract
specifies that the current owner will receive the profits that accrue until the
date at which ownership passes. Then the current owner and the rival are
involved in a finite-horizon game which has as its unique equilibrium the
outcome from the one-shot game.
8 Such signalling might be credible, for example, if there are some types of
managers who are "old-fashioned'1 in the sense that they have never conceived of
maximal punishments, and who therefore revert to the one-shot Nash equilibrium37
inany reversionary period.
9 This result does not depend on the use of one-shot Nash punishments and can
be derived also with maximal punishments. The reason for this is that, as
mentioned above, the domestic firm can be sure to earn at least (a-c)2(1-
r)2/4b(1-6) at any equilibrum. To make the foreign firm earn less than it does
at the one-shot Nash equilibrium for at least one period it must charge aprice
v which is below a. It must then be compensated in later periods for taking
this loss. To obtain a lower bound on this price v we assume that, after taking
this loss, the domestic finn earns the entire monopoiy profits (a-c)2/4b. Then
vmust equal at least (a+e)/2 -[(a-c)/b]{c/2+[o(2c—c2)/(1-6)]1"21so that, to
first order the foreign firm earnsr(a+c)/2 even when it is being pUnished.
10Footnote 7 establishes that for c small, p must be essentially equal to
for the foreign finn not to cheat even with maximal punishments. Since (5) Is
valid in this case as well, monopoly is unsustainable for small tevenwith
maximal punishments.
11 This conclusion, which is also derived by Mookerjee and Ray (1986) for a
slightly different game, is somewhat striking since the domestic firm makes
positive profits If there is static competition by simply charging a price just
less than the foreign firm's marginal cost Inclusive of tariff. The equilibrium
that yields zero profits for the domestic firm is constructed as follows: In
the first period the domestic firm charges a price, u, so low that its losses
(in that period) are exactly equal to the present value of the profits from the
one-shot game from the second period on. The foreign firm charges a price just
slightly higher than u. The foreign firm charges this price every period until
the domestic firm charges u for one period; thereafter both finns revert to the
one-shot outcome each period. -38
12 For evidence on this fact and some alternative explanations see Deardorff
(198C)
13 This hinges critieall3i on the fact that we do not use Abreus (1982) severe
punishments. These are however difficult to characterize In this case.
14 This inequality can be used to demonstrate that the foreign finn always
sells the entire quota when It deviates. When the firms are monopolizing the
market, the domestic Finn is selling (a-c) (1/2-ji)/b so that the best response to
this amount is (a-c) (1/2+ii)/2b. To show that this latter amount is larger than
the quota it suffices to show thatis less than (l/4+p/2). Suppose It were
greater. Then by this inequality It would also have to be greater than 1/4 plus
half the RHS of the inequality. This means that tmustexceed 1/2 minus an
expression whose maximum, reached when c is 1/3 and 6 is 1, equals 1/18. This
is Impossible Ifis less than 1/3.
15 Bernhein and Whinston (1986) consider the more general case of imperfect
correlation. They show that the sustainabiflty of collusion is a monotonically
decreasing function of the degree of correlation across markets, so that we are
considering the extreme that makes collusion most sustainable.
16 This result is in contrast to that of Brander and Spencer (1981). They
consider a model in which the incumbent is committed to sethng its pre-entry
output once entry occurs. In that setting, the incumbent can deter entry by
producing a large enough output. Imposing a tariff on the incumbent may lead it
to prefer to produce a lower output even though that will result in entry.
However, since the incumbent stifi has the option of detering entry, If it
chooses instead to allow entry it must be the case that it receives a higher
price when It does so.So, In their analysis, any tariff big enough to induce
the domestic firm to enter necessarily raises the domestic price above what it39
would have been If the domestic firm was deterred from entering. This result,
however, depends crlticaUy on the absence of perfecteness of their equilibrium.
'A
Sincethereis nological link between the incumbent's pre-entry output and its
post-entry output, the incumbent should be expected to respond optimally to the
entrant's post-entry output. This leads to the Cournot outcome in both markets
post-entry. In that case the above analysis applies.
17 Note that this expression is strictly declining in r as are the espressions
for s (the highest price charged by the domestic firnm) and (a-c)2(1-z)2/b, the
expected profits of the domestic firm.Soour analysis of competition is
consistent with that of Krishna (1985). She analsyzes a duopoly producing
differentiated products. She shows that, in the single shot static game,
reducing a quota raises domestic prices as the domestic firm need not be so
concerned with foreign competition.Our analysis shows that her result extends
to the case in which the duopoly produces a homogeneous good.40
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